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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to the Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 1 et
seg., Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h), and Rules 3 and 4 of the
Utah R. App. P.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court commit error in failing to make

findings on nearly all material issues, including:
A.

Whether Stuart Williamson's $3,550.00 per month

income at the time of his involuntary termination from Morton
International, Inc. due to unsatisfactory job performance should
be imputed to Stuart Williamson for purposes of child support and
alimony.
B.

Whether Stuart Williamson is voluntarily

underemployed at $11.00 per hour when there is employment
available to him at $13.00 to $15.00 per hour.

C.

The effect of a new spouse's contributions to

Stuart Williamson's household on Stuart Williamson's needs and
ability to pay alimony.
D.

The parties' needs and respective ability to meet

those needs relative to alimony, and equalization of the parties'
respective standards of living.
E.

The reasonableness of Joan Williamson's attorney

fees and costs and the relative ability of the parties to pay
attorney fees and costs.
Applicable Standard of Review.

As stated in Whitehouse v.

Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57,71 (Utah App. 1990): ". . . the trial
court must make findings on all material issues, and its failure
to delineate what circumstances have changed and why these
changes support the modification made in the prior divorce decree
constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are
clear, uncontroverted and only support the judgment."

In

addition, "findings should be sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."

Acton v.

Delirian, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987).
Citation to Record Showing Issue was Reserved in Trial
Court. Petition to Modify, R. at 116-20, Answer to Petition to
Modify, R. at 121-22, Amended Petition to Modify, R. at 141-46,
Amended Answer to Petition to Modify, R. at 147-48, and
Transcript throughout.

2

2.

Did the trial court commit error in failing to award

Joan Williamson continued alimony even based upon the trial court
findings of $2,090.00 monthly income to Stuart Williamson and
$1,692.00 monthly income to Joan Williamson which is a $400.00
per month income disparity.
Applicable Standard of Review.

As stated in Ruhsam v.

Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 124, (Utah App. 1987):
It is well established that in divorces trial courts
are given considerable discretion in adjusting the
parties' financial and property interests, and their
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.
Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d 781, 782 (Utah 1986);
Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1983). To
overcome the presumption, the appealing party must
demonstrate that "there was a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and
prejudicial error; or the evidence clearly
preponderated against the findings; or such a serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion." Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752, 753 (Utah
1978); see also Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah
Ct. App. 1978); Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 670-71
(Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Citation to Record Showing Issue was Reserved in Trial
Court, Petition to Modify, R. at 116-20, Answer to Petition to
Modify, R. at 121-22, Amended Petition to Modify, R. at 141-46,
Amended Answer to Petition to Modify, R. at 147-48, and
Transcript throughout.
3.

Did the trial court commit error in failing to award

Joan Williamson her attorney fees and costs.
Applicable Standard of Review.
P.2d

As stated in Wilde v. Wilde,

, 357 U.A.R. 29, 31 (Utah App. 1998):

Both the decision to award attorney fees and the
amount of such fees are within the trial court's sound
discretion. See Crouse v. d o u s e , 817 P.2d 836, 839
3

(Utah Ct. App. 1991). However, "the award [or denial
of such fees] must be based on evidence of the
financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of
the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the
requested fees." Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991). Failure to consider these factors is*
grounds for reversal on the fee issue. See Marshall v.
Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
Citation to Record Showing Issue was Reserved in Trial
Court. Petition to Modify, R. at 116-20, Answer to Petition to
Modify, R. at 121-22, Amended Petition to Modify, R. at 141-46,
Amended Answer to Petition to Modify, R. at 147-48, and
Transcript pages 145, lines 15-23, page 161, lines 9-16.
4.

Whether Joan Williamson should be awarded her attorney

fees and costs on appeal.
Applicable Standard of Review.

As stated in Lynqle v.

Lvngle, 831 P.2d 1027 (Utah App. 1992):
Generally, when the trial court awards fees
in a domestic action to the party who then
substantially prevails on appeal, fees will
also be awarded to that party on appeal. See
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah
App, 1991).
APPLICABLE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.6(6) and (7):
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to
the parent under Subsection (7).
(7)(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent
unless the parent stipulates to the amount
imputed or a hearing is held and a finding
made that the parent is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the
income shall be based upon employment
potential and probable earnings as derived
from work history, occupation qualifications,
4

and prevailing earnings for persons of
similar backgrounds in the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work
history, income shall be imputed at least at
the federal minimum wage for a 4 0-hour work
week. To impute a greater income, the judge
in a judicial proceeding or the presiding
officer in an administrative proceeding shall
enter specific findings of fact as to the
evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of
the following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care
for the parents' minor children approach or
equal the amount of income the custodial
parent can earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or
mentally disabled to the extent he cannot earn
minimum wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or
occupational training to establish basic job
skills; or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical
needs of a child require the custodial
parent's presence in the home.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (7) (a),

(d), and (g):

(7)(a) The court shall consider at least the
following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of
the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or
ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to
provide support; and
(iv)

the length of the marriage.

(d) The court may, under appropriate
circumstances, attempt to equalize the
parties' respective standards of living.
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(g) (i) The court has continuing
jurisdiction to make substantive changes and
new orders regarding alimony based on a
substantial material change in circumstances
not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony
or issue a new order for alimony to address
needs of the recipient that did not exist at
the time the decree was entered, unless the
court finds extenuating circumstances that
justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the
income of any subsequent spouse of the payor
may not be considered, except as provided in
this subsection.
(A) The court may consider the
subsequent spouse's financial ability to
share living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income
or a subsequent spouse if the court finds
that the payor's improper conduct justifies
that consideration.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1):

(1) In any action filed under Title 30,
Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to
establish an order of custody, visitation,
child support, alimony, or division of
property in a domestic case, the court may
order a party to pay the costs, attorney
fees, and witness fees, including expert
witness fees, of the other party to enable
the other party to prosecute or defend the
action. The order may include provision for
costs of the action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a case involving

modification of the child support provision and termination
of the alimony provision of a Decree of Divorce.
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B.

Course of Proceedings.
1.

The parties were divorced by Decree of Divorce

entered May 2, 1996.
2.

On or about September 27, 1996, Stuart Williamson

filed a Petition to Modify the child support provisions of the
Decree of Divorce.

On or about October 3, 1997, Stuart

Williamson filed an Amended Petition to Modify seeking
termination of the alimony provided in the Decree of Divorce.
3.

Trial was held on Stuart Williamson's petition on

February 11, 1998.
4.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order

Modifying Decree of Divorce were entered March 25, 1998.
5.

Joan Williamson filed her Notice of Appeal on

April 22, 1998.
C.

Disposition in the Trial Court:

Finding that the

incomes were different than at the time of the Decree of Divorce,
the trial court found a "substantial change in circumstances",
reduced child support, terminated alimony, and ordered each party
to pay her/his own attorney fees and costs.
D.

Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for

Review:
1.
23 plus years.

Joan Williamson and Stuart Williamson were married
The parties have two children, one of whom,

Julie, was born September 23, 1985, is still a minor and is in
the custody of Joan Williamson.

R. 48,66,67, and 82.

130, lines 2-4.
7

T. page

2.

Joan Williamson and Stuart Williamson were

divorced by Decree of Divorce entered May 24, 1996.

R. 82-96.

copy of the Decree of Divorce is included in the Addendum.

A

The

Decree of Divorce was based upon a Stipulation of the parties. R.

3.

The Decree of Divorce provided for child support

and alimony as follows:
4.
[Stuart Williamson] shall pay to
[Joan Williamson] the sum of $368.00 per
month as child support until such time as the
payments are no longer due, which shall be
when the child turns 18 or would graduate
from high school with her normal high school
class, whichever occurs later. . . .
6.
[Stuart Williamson] shall maintain
health, medical and dental insurance on the
minor child of the parties. . . .
8.
[Stuart Williamson] is required to
pay [Joan Williamson] alimony in the sum of
$425.00 per month until [Joan Williamson]
remarries or cohabits as defined in Utah Code
§ 30-3-5, or either party dies. Alimony
shall commence July 1, 1995.

4.

At the time of the divorce, Stuart Williamson was

employed at Morton International, Inc. where he earned
approximately $3,550.00 per month.

Joan Williamson was employed

at Bourns where she earned approximately $1,442.00 per month.
61,77, and 92.
5.

R.

T. page 12, lines 13-24.
On or about September 27, 1996, Stuart Williamson

filed a Petition to Modify the child support provisions of the
Decree of Divorce.

R. 116-20.

On or about October 3, 1997,

Stuart Williamson filed an Amended Petition to Modify which added
8

a request to modify the alimony provision of the Decree of
Divorce.

R. 141-467.
6.

Stuart Williamson was "involuntarily terminated"

from his employment at Morton International, Inc. by a letter
dated August 29, 1996 which stated the reason for termination to
be "violation of Company Policy; specifically unsatisfactory
performance of job responsibilities."

The letter also stated

that Stuart Williamson could request review of his termination:
"If you are dissatisfied with any aspect of your termination, you
may review the Morton Automotive Safety Products Employee
Handbook as it pertains to the Employee Grievance Process."
Plaintiff's

Exhibit No. 4 (also attached to Addendum); T. page

12, line 25; page 13, lines 1-3; page 16, lines 2-6; page 16,
lines 19-25; page 17; page 18, lines 1-5; page 23, lines 13-25;
pages 24-32; page 33, lines 1-9; page 95, lines 18-25; page 96;
page 97, lines 1-3.
7.

Previous to his termination, Stuart Williamson

received a "Notice of Caution" in October, 1995 involving an
incident where he used "offensive language [and] inappropriate
conduct" toward a co-worker.

Stuart Williamson was told that

"Further violation will result in disciplinary action up to [and]
including termination."

T. page 22 lines 12-25; page 23, lines

1-12; page 33, lines 10-25; page 34; page 35, lines 1-5.
Defendant's Exhibit No. 3; Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3.
8.

Stuart Williamson testified that he did not

9

slur his co-workers in August, 1996 and that he felt

there

was no justification for Morton International, Inc. to
terminate his employment.

T. page 30, lines 3-25; pages 31-34;

Three co-workers testified that they did not personally hear
Stuart Williamson slur his co-workers in August, 1996.

T. page

97, lines 18-25; pages 98-119; page 120, lines 1-21.
9.

Stuart Williamson testified that he did not seek

review of his termination nor seek legal redress because he
didn't think it would do any good.
78, lines 1-17.

T. page 77, lines 21-25; page

Joan Williamson testified that Stuart

Williamson's not seeking review or legal redress was unlike the
Stuart Williamson she was married to for 24 years, who testified
was

"a fighter", "not a quitter", and she could not "see him if

he was wrongly dismissed just to walk away from it."

T. page

135, lines 12-25; page 136, lines 1-6.
10.

Not only did Stuart Williamson lose his $3,550.00

per month income, he also lost the health, medical and dental
insurance that he had on the parties' minor child.

T. page 79,

lines 18-25; page 80, lines 1-10.
11.

Stuart Williamson obtained new employment with his

brother's drywall company where he is paid $11.00 per hour.

T.

page 36, lines 1-5.
12.

Stuart Williamson, and his brother Kirk Williamson

for whom Stuart Williamson works, testified that because of age
and health concerns, Stuart Williamson was not as productive as
he once was.

T. page 14, lines 16-25; page 15, lines 1-20; page
10

55, lines 9-25, pages 56-57; page 58, lines 1-6; page 122, lines
1-22; page 124, lines 24-25; page 125; page 126, lines 1-11.
13.

Kim Pitcher, a drywall contractor who employs some

40 drywall workers, testified that someone of Stuart Williamson's
experience and given Stuart Williamson's age and health concerns,
which he testified were similar to his own, Stuart Williamson
could earn $13.00 to $15.00 per hour:
Mr. Jones. Okay.

And a good, good

drywaller, good taper would have to be pretty
banged up not to be able to at least meet a,
an expected performance level?
A.

Well, I don't know what [Stuart

Williamson] does.

If he's a taper-- I, I

tape too and I'm not as fast as I used to be.
I'm 45.

And, I, I just don't make as much if

I'm out here working.

But I can still

produce.
Q.
A.

Okay.
And I've kind of got the same

symptoms he's got so. . .
Q.

How much could you make as a taper

do you think paying yourself?
A.

Well, I think I'm still around $13

an hour, $13 to $15.
Q.

And on a piece rate?

A.

I think about that.
11

Q.

Pardon me?

A.

About that, yes.

Q.

About $13 to $15 an hour?

A.

About $13 to $15.

T. page 68, lines 16-25; page 69, lines 1-14.
Stuart Williamson himself testified that he "could make probably
$12.25" per hour.
14.

T. page 40, lines 1-2.

Stuart Williamson did drywall work on the side

while employed at Morton International, Inc. and while employed
by his brother.

T. page 146, lines 11-25; page 147, lines 1-7;

page 162, lines 15-25; page 163, lines 1-6.
15.

Joan Williamson's income at Bourns increased from

$8.32 per hour at the time of the divorce (May, 1996) to $9.23
per hour at the time of the modification trial (February, 1998).
T. page 132, lines 12-25; page 133, line 1.
some overtime at Bourns in 1997.

Joan Williamson had

T. page 156, lines 7-14.

Joan

Williamson took an additional part-time job at King's, a
department store, in September, 1997 to supplement her income
when Stuart Williamson stopped paying her alimony.

T. page 141,

lines 8-19; page 154 lines 10-25; page 155, lines 1-19.
16.

The trial court made no findings on the parties'

monthly needs at the time of trial or at the time of the parties'
divorce.

R. 196-201.
17.

s-

At trial, Joan Williamson presented a monthly

budget of $2,288.35 for herself and the parties' daughter.
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9; T. page 142, lines 16-25; pages 14312

144.

Joan Williamson testified that her budget was tight, which

is why she had the second job to help ends meet, and that the
budget put her "somewhat" equal to the standard of living that
she enjoyed while married to Stuart Williamson.

T. page 144,

lines 12-25.
18.

At trial, Stuart Williamson presented a monthly

budget of $1,811.00 which included in it the $252.06 in monthly
child support he figured he owed to Joan Williamson, a $989.00
monthly mortgage payment on a mortgage which he took out at the
time of divorce in order that Stuart Williamson be able to pay to
Joan Williamson $65,000.00 for her equity interest in the
parties' home which Stuart Williamson was awarded in the divorce,
and a VISA bill which was incurred so that he could "pay support"
to Joan Williamson.

Defendant's Exhibit No. 1; T. page 45, lines

2-25; pages 46-49; page 50, lines 1-22.
19.

The trial court found Stuart Williamson's income

at Williamson Drywall, Inc. to be $2,090.00 per month.

R. 197

(Findings of Fact numbered paragraph 7 ) ; T. page 180, lines 1618.
20.

The trial court found Joan Williamson's income,

including some overtime at Bourns, and Joan Williamson's second
job where she earned $75.00 per month, to be a total of $1,692.00
per month at the time of trial.

R. 197 (Findings of Fact,

numbered paragraph 9 ) ; T. page 181, lines 17-21.

The trial court

found Joan Williamson's 1997 income was $1,832.66 per month.
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R.

at 197 (Findings of Fact numbered paragraph 8 ) ; T. page 181,
lines 15-17.
21.

After making its findings on the income of the

parties, the trial court ruled: "I'm going to terminate alimony.
Now to make this effective, and the Court paints this in broad
strokes, I've often said that in the past and I'll reemphasize
that here today."

T. page 181, lines 22-25.

Joan Williamson's

counsel pressed the Court on the alimony issue, pointing out the
$400.00 per month income disparity even on the Court's finding of
the parties' income, to which the trial court said that it was
"close enough" and that in so concluding the trial court was
deducting Stuart Williamson's child support payment from Stuart
Williamson's income and adding Stuart Williamson's child support
to Joan Williamson's income:
THE JUDGE:

I appreciate that,

Counsel, but when you take into account the
child support that he would pay and that she
would receive and their actual incomes,
etcetera, the Court finds that's close
enough.
MR. JONES:

Well but even if you do that,

Your Honor, you take $200 off of hers you'd end up
with $1,443.

Take $250 off of his you end up at

$1,840.
THE JUDGE:

They're within $10 0.

MR. JONES:

You're still $400.
14

THE JUDGE:

No you're not, Counsel.

Your figures are different than mine.
MR. JONES:

Well, I'm, I'm looking at the

child support worksheet, Your Honor.

What Your

Honor said was, and I-- Please just hear me out.
THE JUDGE:

Sure.

MR. JONES:

I'm not trying to argue

with the Court.
THE JUDGE:

Go ahead.

MR. JONES:

But I have a real concern

here because I think that the Court's ruling
is clearly contrary to the case law-THE JUDGE:

All right.

MR. JONES:

-- in a long-term

marriage.
THE JUDGE:

All right.

He's

basically making $2,100.00 gross.
MR. JONES:

$2,100.

THE JUDGE:

She's basically making $1,700

gross.
MR. JONES:

Oh, we11 now you're

rounding out.
THE JUDGE:

Yes.

MR. JONES:

But say it's the $400,

$2,100 and $1,700.

You take $200 off of hers

for child support that makes it 15.
15

You take

$200, it would be $270 or something off of
his, that makes it 18.

$300.

18.

So there's $3 00 even

17 minus 2 is 15.

21 minus 3 is

on your, your numbers that you're essentially
spinning up.

There's still an income

disparity of $3 00 bending over backwards to
his numbers.
THE JUDGE:
manipulation.

Well I appreciate your
But he's making $2,100, she's

making $1,700.
$250.

He gives her $250, she gets

And he's $100 in the hole.

That 's

the way the Court looks at it.
MR. JONES:

Well but Your Honor, but

that doesn't-THE JUDGE:

End of story, Mr. Jones.

Court will be in recess.
T. page 184, lines 2-25, page 185; page 186, lines 1-2.
22.

The trial court accepted both parties' proffer of

$1,500 attorney fees.
9-16.

T. page 145, lines 15-23; page 161, lines

Without making any findings, the trial court ordered each

party to pay her/his own attorney fees and costs.

R. 196-203; T.

page 183, lines 1-2.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I
The trial court's findings are not sufficiently detailed to
disclose the evidentiary basis for the trial court's decision to

lower child support, terminate alimony, and require each party to
pay her/his own attorney fees and costs in this case.

With

regard to child support, the trial court made no finding as to
whether Stuart Williamson's involuntary termination from Morton
International, Inc. due to unsatisfactory job performance, and
Stuart Williamson's taking a job with his brother for $11.00 per
hour instead of the $13.00 to $15.00 he was capable of earning,
rendered Stuart Williamson voluntarily underemployed pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.6(6) and (7).
As to alimony, in addition to the voluntary underemployment
argument above, the trial court made no finding as to the
financial condition of Joan Williamson, Stuart Williamson's
ability to pay alimony, and the length of the marriage as
required by Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 7(a). The trial court found
only that Stuart Williamson was terminated from Morton
International, Inc., has obtained employment at $11.00 per hour,
which with some overtime computed to $2,090.00 per month in
earnings, and that Joan Williamson's income was $1,692.00 per
month which included some overtime and income from a part-time
job.

Based on the findings of "earnings", the trial court found

a substantial change of circumstances and reduced child support
and terminated alimony.
Where the trial court made no findings on the parties' needs
or ability to pay for purposes of alimony, it is not known
whether Joan Williamson's alimony was terminated by the trial
court due to Stuart Williamson's child support obligation to Joan
17

Williamson, a mortgage taken to pay Joan Williamson's equity
interest in the parties' home, and Stuart Williamson's VISA bill
incurred to pay Stuart Williamson's support obligations to Joan
Williamson.

It is also not known whether Stuart Williamson's new

spouse's contribution to Stuart Williamson's household were
considered as allowed by Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7) (g) (iii) (A) .
As to attorney fees and costs, the trial court made no
findings as to the parties' need or ability to pay attorney fees
and costs.
This case should be sent back to the trial court to make
findings which address the issues raised at trial in sufficient
detail to disclose how the trial court reached its ultimate
conclusions in this case.
II
Even accepting the trial court's finding placing Stuart
Williamson's monthly income at $2,090.00 and Joan Williamson's
monthly income $1,692.00, there is still a $400.00 per month
income disparity.

Also, the parties' monthly needs presented to

the trial court established Joan Williamson's greater need and
Stuart Williamson's ability to meet his own needs and still pay
alimony.

Joan Williamson's need was $2,288.35 per month and

Stuart Williamson's need was $1,811.00 per month which included
his child support payment to Joan Williamson, Stuart Williamson's
mortgage taken out to pay Joan Williamson her $65,000.00 property
settlement payment in the divorce, and Stuart Williamson's VISA
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bill to pay for money borrowed to pay his support obligations to
Joan Williamson.
This case involves a marriage of 23 years and two children,
one of whom is still a minor.

The trial court's subtracting

child support from Stuart Williamson's income and adding it to
Joan Williamson's income without recognizing that Joan Williamson
also has a child support obligation makes no sense.

The trial

court's termination of alimony leaves Joan Williamson to support
two people on the same income as Stuart Williamson has to support
only himself, and his household expenses are being shared by a
new spouse.
Also, Where the parties' child is now 13 years old,
support will only be owed for 5 more years.

child

The parties were

married for 23 years and the Decree of Divorce in this case
provided that alimony continue until Joan Williamson's remarriage
or cohabitation of either parties' death.
The trial court's termination of alimony, even on its
limited finding of monthly income, was an abuse of discretion and
should be reversed and the alimony payment to Joan Williamson
reinstated back to the date the trial court terminated the
alimony and the alimony should be in an amount of at least
$200.00 per month so that the parties' respective standards of
living may be more equalized.
Ill
The trial court accepted both parties' proffer of $1,500.00
attorney fees.

Without making any findings, the trial court
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ordered each to pay her/his own attorney fees.

Where Stuart

Williamson has the greater income earning ability and greater
ability to pay attorney fees, Joan Williamson should be awarded
her attorney fees both in the trial court and on appeal.
ARGUMENTS
I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE LEGALLY
INSUFFICIENT IN THIS CASE.
As stated in the "Issues Presented on Review", the trial
court failed to make findings on nearly all issues, including
A.

Whether Stuart Williamson's $3,550.00 per month

income at the time of his involuntary termination from Morton
International, Inc. due to unsatisfactory job performance should
be imputed to Stuart Williamson for purposes of child support and
alimony.
B.

Whether Stuart Williamson is voluntarily

underemployed at $11.00 per hour when there is employment
available to him at $13.00 to $15.00 per hour.
C.

The effect of a new spouse's contributions to

Stuart Williamson's household on Stuart Williamson's needs and
ability to pay alimony.
D.

The parties' needs and respective ability to meet

those needs relative to alimony, and equalization of the parties'
respective standards of living.
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E.

The reasonableness of Joan Williamson's attorney

fees and costs and the relative ability of the parties to pay
attorney fees and costs.
At trial, Joan Williamson argued that because Stuart
Williamson was involuntarily terminated due to unsatisfactory job
performance, the full $3,550.00 per month that he was earning at
the time of trial should be imputed to him and there should be no
substantial change of circumstances and therefore no reduction of
child support and no termination of alimony.
The evidence showed that Stuart Williamson was underemployed
in that he could earn $13.00 to $15.00 per hour instead of the
$11.00 per hour he was actually earning and on which the trial
court found Stuart Williamson's current income.

Stuart

Williamson himself testified that he could $12.25 per hour.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.6(6) and (7) allows income to be
imputed for purposes of child support if "a hearing is held and a
finding made that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed."

In imputing income, the trial court must base

the income "upon employment potential and probable earnings as
derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and
prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the
community."
As stated in Griffith v. Griffith,

P.2d

, 344

U.A.R. (Utah App. 1998), "the goal of imputing income is to
prevent parents from reducing their child support or alimony by
purposeful unemployment or underemployment."
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The trial court made no finding relative to Stuart
Williamson's working a second job during and since the parties'
marriage.

As held in Crompton v. Crompton, 888 P.2d 686, 689

(Utah App. 1994) with regard to alimony: "A trial court must be
able to consider all sources of income that were used by the
parties during the marriage to meet their self-defined needs,
from whatever source--overtime, second job, self employment,
etc., as well as unearned income."
In this case, the trial court made no finding on whether
Stuart Williamson was voluntarily underemployed despite
substantial evidence relative to his involuntary termination due
to unsatisfactory job performance, greater employment potential,
a long work history of greater income, a long work history of
second job income, and significant occupation qualifications even
as a drywaller.
The trial court made no finding relative to Stuart
Williamson's new spouse's contribution to Stuart Williamson's
household though Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(iii)(A) authorizes
the trial court to do so.
The trial court made no findings as to Joan Williamson's
financial condition and needs, the ability of Stuart Williamson
to provide support, and the length of the marriage as required by
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a)(i)-(iv).

The evidence showed that

Joan Williamson's monthly needs were nearly $2,288.35 while
Stuart Williamson's were only $1,811.00 which even included his
child support payment to Joan Williamson, Stuart Williamson's
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mortgage payment for the $65,000.00 borrowed to pay Joan
Williamson for her equity interest in the parties' home, and
Stuart Williamson's VISA payment for money borrowed to pay Joan
Williamson her support.
The trial court made no findings relative to equalizing the
parties' respective standards of living which the trial court may
do in appropriate cases.

Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5(7) (d).

A

marriage of 23 plus years warrants an equalization of the
parties' respective standards of living.
The trial court accepted both parties' proffers of $1,500.00
attorney fees but made no finding of reasonableness or need which
the trail court may do pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1).
Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the trial
courts in action of this kind to "find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions thereon."

As stated in Hall v.

Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Allred v.
Allred, 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah App. 1990) : "Findings are
adequate only if they are 'sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'"
The only finding of the trial court in this case is as to
current monthly income.
Where the trial court's findings are limited to the only one
of the many issues before the trial court, Joan Williamson should
not be required to "engage in a futile marshalling exercise".
Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638, (Utah App. 1995),
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(citing Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477-78 (Utah App.
1991)).
As stated in Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah
App. 1993):
Indeed, Utah Courts have held that "[a]n
alimony award should, after a marriage . . .
and to the extent possible, equalize the
parties' respective standards of living and
maintain them at a level as close as possible
to that standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage." Gardner v. Gardner, 74 8 P.2d
1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); see also Jones v.
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985);
Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah
App. 1992); Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 491
(Utah App. 1991). In light of this goal, the
trial court must consider: "(1) the financial
conditions and needs of the receiving spouse;
(2) the ability of the receiving spouse to
produce a sufficient income; and (3) the
ability of the supporting spouse to provide
support." Roberts, 835 P.2d at 198; see also
Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075; Chambers, 840 P.2d
at 843; Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84,
90 (Utah App. 1989).
Failure to consider these factors in
fashioning an alimony award constitutes an
abuse of discretion. Bell, 810 P.2d at 492.
Accordingly, "the trial court must make
sufficient detailed findings of fact on each
factor . . . unless the record is clear and
uncontroverted" and capable of supporting
only a finding in favor of the trial court's
award. .Id.; see also Chambers, 840 P.2d at
843; Roberts, 835 P.2d at 198.
As to a finding with regard to Joan Williamson's attorney
fees and costs, please see "Issues Presented on Appeal", numbered
paragraph 3, above.
This case should be reversed and the $368.00 child support
and $425.00 alimony set forth in the Decree of Divorce should be
reinstated.

In the alternative, this case should be remanded to
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the trial court for findings relative to Stuart Williamson's
voluntary underemployment by virtue of his involuntary
termination due to unsatisfactory job performance, working at
$11.00 per hour when he could earn $13.00 to $15.00 per hour,
Joan Williamson's needs and Stuart Williamson's ability to pay
alimony, and the reasonableness of Joan Williamson's attorney
fees and Joan Williamson's need and the parties' relative ability
to pay Joan Williamson's attorney fees and costs.
II
JOAN WILLIAMSON IS ENTITLED TO SUBSTANTIAL, LONG TERM
ALIMONY AND THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO SO PROVIDE
This case involved a 23 year plus marriage.

The parties had

2 children one of whom is still a minor (Julie, age 13) and is
Joan Williamson's custody.

The parties' Decree of Divorce, based

on a Stipulation, provided

for $368.00 per month child support

and $425.00 per month alimony.

Due to no fault whatever of Joan

Williamson, Stuart Williamson was involuntarily terminated from
his employment due to unsatisfactory job performance, lost his
$3,550.00 per month income and health, medical and dental
insurance on the parties' minor child, and Stuart Williamson took
a job at $11.00 per hour with his brother when he could have
obtained employment at $13.0 0 to $15.0 0 per hour.
However, even if the foregoing is upheld, there exists a
nearly $400.00 income disparity between Joan Williamson's and
Stuart Williamson's current incomes as found by the trial court.
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Though not found by the trial court, Joan Williamson
testified that her monthly needs were $2,288.35.

Stuart

Williamson testified that his needs were $1,811.00 - and that
included his child support payment to Joan Williamson, Stuart
Williamson's mortgage payment on the $65,000.00 borrowed to pay
Joan Williamson her equity from the parties' home, and Stuart
Williamson's VISA bill incurred to pay Joan Williamson her
support.
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court on numerous occasions:
An alimony award should, as far as possible,
equalize the parties' respective standards of
living and maintain them at a level as close
as possible to the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage. In determining the
amount of alimony to be awarded, it was
necessary for the trial court to consider the
financial condition and needs of the
Plaintiff, her ability to produce a
sufficient income for herself, and the
ability of the Defendant to provide support
Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 556 (Utah 1985) (footnotes
omitted).

See also English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977)

and Higlev v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983).
An equalization of income in this case even on the trial
court's finding of current income would require an alimony award
of at least $200.00 per month.
The trial court's adding Stuart Williamson's child support
payment to Joan Williamson's income is an abuse of discretion.
In so doing, the trial court is essentially requiring Joan
Williamson herself to pay Stuart Williamson's child support
obligation.
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The trial court's termination of alimony is also an abuse of
discretion.

In their Stipulation, which was incorporated into

the Decree of Divorce, the parties agreed that alimony be paid
until Joan Williamson's remarriage or cohabitation or the death
of either party.

The parties' minor child is only 13.

When the

child is 18 the parties will only have been divorced 6 or so
years.

Under the trial court's ruling, Joan Williamson would

presumably be precluded from having her alimony reinstated after
the parties' minor child reaches 18 because it may be construed
as being reasonably contemplated at this time.

As stated in

Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah App 1993):
. . . where a future change in circumstances
is contemplated by the trial court in the
divorce decree, the fulfillment of that
future change will not constitute a material
change of circumstances sufficient to modify
the award. "A change in circumstances
reasonably contemplated at the time of
divorce is not legally cognizable as a
substantial change in circumstances in
modification proceedings." Dana v. Dana, 789
P.2d 726, 729 (Utah app. 1990); see also
Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah
App. 1990) (a material change in
circumstances contemplated in the divorce
decree cannot be grounds for a future
modification).
The trial court's termination of alimony under the
circumstances of this case was contrary to the parties'
Stipulation, statutory law and case law, and was a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion.

The alimony should be

reinstated effective from the trial court's date of termination.
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Ill
JOAN WILLIAMSON IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF HER ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS IN THIS CASE AT TRIAL AND ON APPEAL
The trial court accepted both parties' proffers of $1500.00
attorney fees and costs.

Without any finding of reasonableness

or need, the trial court ordered each party to pay her/his own
attorney fees and costs.
Section 30-3-3 Utah Code Ann. (1994) provides that a trial
court may award attorney fees and costs in a divorce action.

In

order to recover on her attorney fees and costs, Joan Williamson
was required at trial to show that the fees and costs requested
were reasonable and that Joan Williamson was financially unable
to pay the fees and costs.

Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah

1986) .
As to reasonableness, the trail court accepted the parties'
proffers.

As to need, Joan Williamson testified that her monthly

needs were $2,288.35 and the trial court found her monthly income
to be $1,692.00, and awarded her $252.00 child support and
terminated her alimony.

Joan Williamson has little or no

financial ability to pay her attorney fees and costs.
Stuart Williamson has the greater income and income earning
ability and has a new spouse who shares his household expenses.
Joan Williamson, having met her burden on both
reasonableness of the fees and costs incurred, her need, and
Stuart Williamson's far greater ability to pay the fees and
costs, should have been awarded all of her reasonable attorney
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fees and costs in this matter.

The trial court's failure to

award her fees was an abuse of discretion an should be reversed.
Joan Williamson respectfully submits that where she had a
continuing need and Stuart Williamson's income and earning
ability far exceeded her own, she should also be awarded a
reasonable attorney fee and costs incurred subsequent to trial
and in the bringing of this appeal.
CONCLUSION
Joan Williamson respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the trial court and reinstate her $425.00 alimony as set
forth in the parties' Stipulation and as incorporated in the
Decree of Divorce in this case.

In the alternative, Joan

Williamson respectfully requests that this case be remanded to
the trial court for findings on all issues material to this case.
Also, in the alternative, Joan Williamson respectfully requests
that the parties' current income as found by the trial court be
equalized so that the parties' respective standards of living be
equalized, said alimony to be indeterminate.

Finally, Joan

Williamson respectfully requests that she be awarded her attorney
fees and costs at the trial level and on appeal.
DATED this 14th day of December, 1998.
HI^LYARD, A^BSRSON & OLSEN

^arry E. gpned
Attorney fiforyPetitioner/Appellant
original signature
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed, postpaid, to the
following this 14th day of December, 1998:
Mr. Pete N. Vlahos
Attorney at Law
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN

^Larry E.
Attorney &h?f Petitioner/Appellant
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A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

!

175 EAST FIRST NORTH
L O G A N , U T A H 84321
TELEPHONE ( 8 0 1 )

752-2610

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOAN WILLIAMSON,

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

)

DECREE OF DIVORCE

)

STUART KIM WILLIAMSON,
Defendant.

)

Case No. 954 207

)

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on July 6, 1995. The Honorable Commissioner Daniel W.
Garner presided.

Plaintiff appeared in person and by and

through her attorney, Larry E. Jones of Hillyard, Anderson &
Olsen.

The Court reviewed the written Stipulation of the

parties previously filed.
Plaintiff.

The Court heard evidence from

The Court now having before it the Stipulation

of the parties, the evidence, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded a Decree of

Divorce against Defendant, said decree to become final upon
signing and filing by the Court.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant are the parents of two (2)

children as issue of this marriage, one of whom is still a
minor, namely:
3.

Julie Williamson, born September 23, 1985.

Plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control

of the parties' minor child, subject to Defendant having _

.
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reasonable visitation.

Reasonable visitation shall be as

set forth on the summary of statutory visitation attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this reference incorporated
herein.

Defendant shall have no visitation with the

parties' daughter when Defendant has been or is drinking.
M

Further, in the event either party decides to move from the

1
5

State of Utah or 150 miles or more from the Logan, Utah

D

z

area, Plaintiff and Defendant may agree to who will bear the
expense for transportation for visitation purposes. If

|

Plaintiff and Defendant are not able to agree, Plaintiff and

»-

P Defendant shall submit the matter to the Court for
g consideration by the Court, the Court to factor in the
in

reason for relocation, the additional costs or difficulty to
tn

o

z
o
(/)
UJ

g

Plaintiff and Defendant in exercising visitation, the
economic resources of both parents, and any other factors
the Court may deem necessary and relevant

<

£

4.

Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of $368.00

>

j

per month as child support until such time as the payments

u

are no longer due, which shall be when the child turns 18 or

iZ
LL

5. would graduate from high school with her normal high school
<

class, whichever occurs later.

Said child support was

computed in accordance with the Uniform Civil Liability for
Support Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-1 et seq.

A copy of the

Child Support Obligation Worksheets which were averaged to
come up with the child support in this case is attached
hereto as Exhibits "B" and "C" and by this reference
2

incorporated herein.

Child support shall commence July 1,

1995.
5.

In addition to the child support, Defendant shall

pay to Plaintiff one-half the work or training-related child
care expense for the child of the parties.

Plaintiff shall

5

provide written verification of the cost and identity of a

5

child care provider upon initial engagement of a provider

D

z

and thereafter on the request of Defendant.

Plaintiff shall

notify Defendant of any change of child care provider or the
monthly expense of child care within 30 calendar days of the
date of the change.

Reimbursement to Plaintiff for

Defendant's one-half of the child care expense shall be paid
to Plaintiff by Defendant within ten days from receipt of
written verification of payment by Plaintiff.

So long as

2
O
w
a:

not unduly disruptive to the child care arrangement,
§ Defendant shall be entitled to provide child care for the
UJ

<

§

minor child, subject to Defendant having not been drinking
or drinking when he provides the child care.
6.

^

Defendant shall maintain health, medical and dental

insurance on the minor child of the parties.

Plaintiff

shall also maintain health, medical and dental insurance on
the minor child of the parties when available to her at her
place of employment at reasonable cost. Any uninsured
expense for the minor child of the parties, including
deductibles and copayments, shall be shared equally by the
parties.

Health, medical and dental expense is expressly
3

understood by the parties to include reasonable orthodontic,
eye care, and eyeglass expenses. A parent who incurs
uninsured health, medical or dental expenses shall provide
written verification of the cost and payment of the
uninsured health, medical or dental expenses to the other
w

parent within 30 days of payment.

Reimbursement for one-

00

5

half the uninsured health, medical or dental expenses shall

H
D

z" be paid to the incurring parent by the other parent within
o
o

ten days from the receipt of the written verification.
7.

The parties shall alternate the tax dependency

exemption on the parties' minor child, Defendant to have the
2

exemption in odd years beginning with 1995, and Plaintiff to
have the exemption in even years beginning with 1996.
8.

Defendant is required to pay Plaintiff alimony in

the sum of $425.00 per month until Plaintiff remarries or
2

cohabits as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 3 0-3-5, or either
party dies. Alimony shall commence July 1, 1995.

>-

=!

9.

Defendant shall instruct his employer to withhold

from Defendant's paycheck the child support and alimony
^

provided for herein, said child support and alimony to be
sent by the employer to a checking account belonging to
Plaintiff.

If for any reason Defendant fails to so instruct

his employer, or Defendant's employer declines to abide by
said instruction, or Defendant falls into arrears in his
payment of child support and alimony, Defendant consents to
Plaintiff's collection of child support and alimony through
4

statutory income withholding as provided by Utah Code Ann. §
62A-11-401 et seq. (1994).
10.

Defendant is awarded the real property of the

parties, which property is located at 2740 West 5700 South,
Wellsville, Utah 8433 9, and which is more particularly
described on Exhibit "D" which is attached hereto and by
5

this reference incorporated herein.

Plaintiff shall provide

i-

z

to Defendant a quit-claim deed conveying any and all of her

o
J

. interest in the property to Defendant.

Defendant shall be

i-

|

obligated to pay the mortgage to First Security Bank, as

\-

£

well as any and all taxes, insurance, or expenses or

i-

<

payments of any kind associated with the property,^ and to

m

indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
11.

Plaintiff is awarded all personal property set

forth on Exhibit "E" attached hereto and by this reference
incorporated herein, her personal items and effects, as well
as the personal property, items and effects of and for the
minor child of the parties.
12.

Defendant is awarded all personal property set

forth on Exhibit "F" attached hereto and by this reference
incorporated herein, as well as his personal items and
effects.
13.

Plaintiff and Defendant shall each be awarded a

one-half interest in any and all retirement benefits which
the other may have through their places of employment.

Said

interest shall be divided in accordance with the so-called
5

Woodward formula as set forth in the case of Woodward v.
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).

Each shall be awarded a

survivor benefit at least equivalent in amount to their
retirement interest awarded herein, said benefit to be at
the survivor's expense.
5

Each shall prepare and submit to

the other's employer an appropriate Qualified Domestic

CD

5

Relation Order to accomplish and effect the distribution and

»D

z
<
i
o
o

S
z

severance of said retirement interest.

Each shall execute

£

transfer of interest in said retirement. Plaintiff and
any and all documents necessary for the other to obtain a
Defendant may each continue to name or may in the future

£

rename the other as a beneficiary on any of the foregoing

in

retirement interests, the named party to have all rights as
a beneficiary.
0
ir

§

14. The proceeds of the life insurance policies which
the parties have cashed shall be used to pay the VISA

<
<

§

obligation, in the approximate sum of $4,000.00, with the

>-

_J

=! remainder of the insurance proceeds to be divided equally
S

between the parties.

LL
LL
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15.

Plaintiff shall pay the following debts and

<
-j

obligations:
Creditor

Amount

Any and all debts which Plaintiff has incurred in
her own name since June 1, 1995.

O"?

Plaintiff shall indemnify and hold Defendant harmless from
the foregoing debts.
16.

Defendant shall pay the following debts and

obligations:

s

Creditor

Amount

First Security Bank

$100,000.00

As well as any and all debts which Defendant has
incurred in his own name since June 1, 1995,

<

D

2

<

O

o

Defendant shall indemnify and hold Plaintiff harmless from

_]

|
o

the foregoing debts.

2

£
17. To pay Plaintiff for her equity interest in the
tn
jj parties' home, Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of
<
UJ

J5 $65,000.00, said payment to be made on or before the entry
£

of the Decree of Divorce in this matter,

o

18.
|

Plaintiff and Defendant shall divide equally any

itemizable 1995 tax deductions which have accrued up to the
date of the parties' divorce.

5

19.

Plaintiff shall maintain life insurance on her

life in the sum of $18,000.00 so long as reasonably
available from her employer, and Defendant shall maintain
life insurance on his life in the sum of $45,000.00 so long
as reasonably available from his employer.

Plaintiff and

Defendant shall each name the parties' minor child as the
beneficiary on said insurance, each to be entitled to name
trustee if desired.

Plaintiff and Defendant shall provide

each other with documentation of the insurance both as to
amount and beneficiary designation within 3 0 days of the

date this Decree of Divorce is entered in this case, and on
January 1 of each calendar year commencing January 1, 1996.
20.

Plaintiff and Defendant shall each pay their own

attorney fees and costs incurred in this matter.
21.

Each party shall act in good faith in signing and

delivering to the other party any additional documents,
instruments, and writings, including deeds, releases, and
securities, which may be necessary to enforce or carry out
the terms of the Stipulation and this document.
22.

Any party discovering any property not disclosed

in the Stipulation or this document shall be entitled to
petition the Court for an equitable decision of such
property.
23.

In the event either party to this agreement

defaults on his or her obligations hereunder, the party in
default shall be liable to the prevailing party for all
reasonable expenses, including attorney fees and court costs
incurred in the enforcement of the obligations created by
the Stipulation and the Court Decree.
Dated this ^OH

day of

fiT\^ajd^

1996
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EXHIBIT

"A"

U.C.A. SEC. 30-3-55 MINIMUM SCHEDULE FOR VISITATION
(SUMMARIZED)
Effective May 3, 1993
Reasonable Visitation should be defined as the parents may agree. If they are not able to
agree, the definition for school-age children (beginning kindergarten) will be as follows:
Midweek:

One weekday evening specified from 5:30 - 8:30 p.m.

Alternate Weekends: Friday 6.-00 p.m. to Sunday 7:00 p.m.
HOUDAYS TAKE PRECEDENCE'OVER THE WEEKEND VISITATION AND
THE ALTERNATING WEEKEND SCHEDULE DOES N O T CHANGE.
Holiday Visitation: (6:00 p.m. day before the holiday to 7:00 p.m. of the
holiday unless specified otherwise)
O D D NUMBERED YEARS
EVEN NUMBERED YEARS
New Year's Day
Human Rights Day
President's Day
Easter from Fri 6:00 p.m. to
July 4th to 11:00 p.m.
Sun 7:00 p.m.
Labor Day from Fri 6:00 to
Memorial Day Fri 6:00 p.m. to
Mon. 7:00 p.m.
Mon 7:00 p.m.
Columbus Day
July 24th to 11:00 p.m.
UEA weekend from Wed 6:00 p.m.
Veteran's Day
Day before or after child's birthday
to Sun 7:00 p.m.
Child's actual Birthday to 9:00 p.m.
3:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.
First half Christmas Vacation, including Thanksgiving from Wed 7:00 pm.
to Sun 7:00 p.m.
Christmas Eve and Christmas Day
Second Half Christmas Vacation
to 1:00 p.m.
beginning 1:00 p.m. Christmas Day

Father's Day:

With Father 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.

Mother's Day:

With Mother 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.

Summer:

4 weeks during summer or, if year round, 1/2 school breaks, custodial,
parent allowed two weeks uninterrupted. Notification of summer
visitation or vacation weeks with children should be provided in
writing to the other parent at least 30 days in advance.

Telephone-

Contact at reasonable hours

U N I F O R M VISITATION GUIDELINES
1993
F u r t h e r Clarifications:
F A M I L Y F U N C T I O N S : Special consideration shall be given each parent to make the
child available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions,
religious holidays,.important ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of the
child o r in the life of cither parent which, may inadvertently conflict with the visitation
schedule;
PICKUP/RETURN:
The noncustodial parent shall pick up the child at the times
specified and return the child at the time specified, and the child's regular school hours
shall not be interrupted;
RECORDS/REPORTS:
The custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent
within 24 hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports and community
functions in which the child is participating or being honored, and the noncustodial parent
shall be entitled to attend and participate fully;
C H A N G E O F ADDRESS:
Each parent shall provide the other with his current
address and telephone number within 24 hours of any change;
CHILD CARE:
Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child
than surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the
noncustodial parent, if willing and able, to provide child care;
RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS:
Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major
religious holidays celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious
holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the right to be together with the
child on the religious holiday.

Q i

EXHIBIT "B"
IN THE

DISTRICT COURT

FTKST

CACTP;

COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOAN WILLIAMSON
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHE^
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY)"

vs.

Civil No. 'QS4 ->(\n

STUART KIM WILLIAMSON

MOTHER

FATHER

' COM3INED

1/////////// [///////////

11. Enter the £ of natural and adopted children of this
1
mother and father for whom support is to be awarded.
/ / / / / / / / / / / (///////////
s
J 2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly
$
income. Refer to Instructions for definition of
///////////
3550
1442
[j income.
\ / / / / / / / / / / j

I

2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually
paid. (Do not enter alimony ordered for this case) .

U

//////////.
//////////

|2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not
[enter obligations ordered for the children in Line 1) .
|2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount froa Line 12 of the
Children in Present Home Worksheet for either parent.

//////////.

1//////////

-

-

3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This £s the
Adjusted Gross Income for child support purposes,
j

1442

j

//////////.
//////////

$

/////////// I

$

3500 . | 4942

<. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the nuaber
///////////!
of children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the*
/////////// / / / / / / / / / / /
Base Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here.
|/////////// / / / / / / / / / / /
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line
3 by the COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3.

29.18v

6. Multiply Line < by Line 5 for each parent to obtain $
each parent's share of the Base Support Obligation.
|

155.82

70.82

5 378.18

7. BASE rmrm SUPPORT AHARD:
Bring down the amount in Line 6
for the .Obligor Parent or enter-the amount from -the Low Income
Table.

//////////,
//////////,
//////////.
//////////

378.18

8.

Which parent is the obligor?

5.

Is the support award ordered different froa the guideline account in Line 7?
( J Yes ( ] Ko If YES, enter the amount ordered: $

10.

What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation?
( ) property settlement
( ) excessive debts of the marriage
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent
( } other:
'
,

Attorney Bar No.-

( ) Mother

v

534

( ) Father

( ) Electronic filing

( } Manual filing

7/J 4

93

EXHIBIT "D

WHEN RECORDED RETURN TO:

SEND TAX NOTICES TO

QUIT-CLAIM DEED
JOAN WILLIAMSON, Grantor, of Cache County, State of Utah,
hereby quit-claims to STUART KIM WILLIAMSON, Grantee, for the sum
of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and ot2her good and valuable
consideration, the following described tract of land in Cache
County, State of Utah:
SEE ATTACHED FOR THE LEGAL DESCRIPTION,
WHICH BY THIS REFERENCE IS MADE A PART HEREOF.
WITNESS, the hand of said Grantor, this
, 1995.

day of

JOAN WILLIAMSON
STATE OF UTAH
County of Cache

)
: ss.
)

On the
day of May,
, personally appeared
before me JOAN WILLIAMSON, the signer of the within instrument,
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

NOTARY PUBLIC

g:\data\lej\williamson.dee
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EXHIBIT "E"
PERSONAL PROPERTY ITEMS TO BE
AWARDED TO JOAN WILLIAMSON
1990 Chevrolet Blazer
All personal property agreed upon
All personal items and effects
All personal property items and effects of and for Julie

lej\williamsor\.exd

EXHIBIT

p

PERSONAL PROPERTY ITEMS TO BE
AWARDED TO STUART WILLIAMSON
1982 GMC 4x4 Truck
Snowplow
Horse Trailer
Camping Trailer
1982 Chevrolet Capri automobile
All personal property agreed upon
All personal items and effects
lej\williamson.exe

ADDENDUM B

IMorton

August 29, 1996

Stuart K. Williamson
2740 West 5700 South
Wellsville, UT 84339
Dear Kim:
This letter is to inform you of your involuntary termination of employment with Morton Automotive
Safety Products effettive today, August 29, 1996. This action was taken as a violation of Company
Policy; specifically unsatisfactory performance ofjob responsibilities.
As a severance package you will receive the following:
2 weeks of pay in lieu of notice
6 weeks of pay (one week for each year of service)
8 Total
Information regarding your medical insurance and the Employee Savings and Investment Plan (if
applicable) will be mailed to you separately.
We regret that your actions have brought us to this conclusioa If you are dissatisfied with any aspect
of your termination, you may review the Morton Automotive Safety Products Employee Handbook
as it pertains to the Employee Grievance Process.

Sincerely,

(•

Judfith A. Mueller, Manager
Employee Relations

Morton A utomotive Safety Products
Morton International. Inc.. .v>7) Airport Rthul. O^lcn. I T . W W StUrt_Y~/,v//;/-./.v ,*>"/ ••»;/-•
CASE NO.

OAJEBBCD

I W EVIDENCE
[CLERK

^Zz^ZZf

ADDENDUM C

1 ||

THE JUDGE:

You offered EXHIBIT #2 and

2 || EXHIBIT #3 but you just didn't EXHIBIT # 1 .
3

II

4

MR. V L A H O S :

I don't see where EXHIBIT

went but I offered all three of

5

THE JUDGE:

them.

Wherever it may be let's make

6

certain that that's introduced, given to the

7

before you leave.

8

MR. V L A H O S :

9

Court

I gave the Court a copy and

I--

10

COURT'S

11

THE JUDGE:

indicate, Mr. V l a h o s , I'll

13

the findings and
J

RULING

Now in ruling on this let me

12

14

#1

direct that you

prepare

conclusions.

Court does find that there has been a

15

change of circumstances and I will adjust

16

support as follows:

17

the income of mother should be $1,643, for the

18

father it should be $2,090.^

19

And quite frankly

I'm not quite sure where we came

20

up with $1,643.

All of the calculations

21

show that she makes in excess of that.

22 II
23 || error.
24 ||

MR. V L A H O S :

the

For purposes of child

child

support

That's per month.

I apologize.

I make

I made

an

I apologize.
THE JUDGE:

25 || and I think h e ' s , I'm

But Mr. Vlahos prepared

it

going to stick him with his

PENNY C. ABBOTT,

CSR/TRANSCRIBER
PAGE 18 0

1 II figure.
2 ||
3

For the purposes of alimony

[j calculated, and I'd

I've

like this shown in the

findings

4

and conclusions, Mr. V l a h o s , that her actual

5

last year was $1,832.66 per m o n t h .

6

testimony that she is now making

7

month.

8

monthly basis and $70 per month as overtime at her

9

regular employment.

10
11

income

But from her

$1,692.56 per

But that is the $75 from King's on a

The Court is--

MR. VLAHOS:

That figure is what?

Comes

up to a total of what, Your Honor?-

12

THE JUDGE:

There's

three figures that

13

should be reflected.

14

Court's going to accept

15

you proposed for her income.

16

actual income shown from the W-2s

17

that her income was $1,832.66.

18

her income this year would be $1,692.56.

19

calculated that at $70 from the, per month for

20

overtime and $75 per month from King's.

21

what she testified to.

22

Number one is that

the

$1,643 which is the figure
I note that the
last year show
From her

I'm going to terminate alimony.

testimony
And

I've

That's

Now to

23 |] make this effective, and the Court paints this in
24 It

broad strokes, I've

25 II

I'll

often said that in the past and

reemphasize that here today.
PENNY C. A B B O T T ,

Mr. Vlahos,

I'm

CSR/TRANSCRIBER
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1

show not sure, has your client paid the child

2

support for

February?

3

MR. V L A H O S :

4

MR. KIM WILLIAMSON:

, 5

He's paid-For February I paid

child support and alimony, Your Honor.

6

THE JUDGE:

For

7

MR. VLAHOS:

He testified

8

February?
that he sold his

truck and paid it.
THE J U D G E :

9

All right.

The child

support

10

will be effective

11

child support.

12

calculate that out and whatever he's paid that is

13

when, up to, that

14

alimony.

15

alimony but she doesn't owe him any rebates in

16

what's been paid up to this point

17
18

as of March 1st, the reduction
The alimony I want you to

is when I'm going to terminate

In other w o r d s , he doesn't pay any more

MR. V L A H O S :

THE JUDGE:

in time.

So alimony will

and offset retroactively

19

in

terminate

to what owes her?

To whatever he owes.

I'm

20

just going to say that whatever he's paid in the

21

past she may keep, she doesn't owe him anything.

22

But I can't ascertain from what you've told me what

23

date that would be effective as of so calculate

24

that.

25

and he doesn't have to pay any m o r e .

And in other w o r d s , she keeps what she's got

PENNY C. A B B O T T ,

CSR/TRANSCRIBER
PAGE 18 2

1 ||

Each p a r t y to pay their own costs of

2 || and attorney's
3

fees.

Mr. Vlahos, will you

court

prepare

II t h e - -

4

MR. J O N E S :

5

of questions

Your Honor, I have a couple

if I may.

6

THE JUDGE:

Go ahead.

7

MR. J O N E S :

First we have the health,

8

medical and dental on the child.

9

included with the child

That should be

support?

10

THE JUDGE:

It should be.

11

MR. V L A H O S :

If his wife can get it, Your

12

Honor, can we allow that to happen?

13
14
15

J
it.

16
17
18
19
20

THE J U D G E :

Certainly.

MR. V L A H O S :

Okay.

She's applied

for

They've only been married a month s o . . .
THE JUDGE:

Hopefully that will

come

about.
MR. KIM WILLIAMSON:

I'll have her

apply

and put her name on it.
THE JUDGE:

Yes.

Hopefully that

will

21 If come about.
22 II

MR. J O N E S :

Your Honor and I, and

23 || going to question the Court on this one.

I'm
If Your

24 || Honor finds the $1,692.56 on hers and the $2,090
25 || his, that's still a $400 income disparity.
PENNY C. A B B O T T ,

on

This

CSR/TRANSCRIBER
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1

II

was a 24 year marriage.

2 ||

THE JUDGE:

I appreciate

3

II but when you take into account

4

II

that, Counsel,

the child

support

that he would pay and that she would receive

5

their actual incomes, etcetera, the Court

6

that's close

7

and

finds

enough.

MR. JONES:

Well but even if you do that,

8

Your Honor, you take $200 off of hers you'd end up

9

with $1,443.

10

Take $250 off of his you end up at

$1, 840 .

11

THE JUDGE:

They're within $100.

12

MR. JONES:

You're still

13

THE JUDGE:

No you're not, Counsel.

14

Your figures are different

15

MR. JONES:

16
17

$400.

than mine.

Well I'm,

I'm

looking at the

child support worksheet, Your Honor.
j j Honor sail v: as, and I - -

Please

What

Your

jusu hear :^e cut.

18

THE JUDGE:

Sure!

19

MR. JONES:

I'm not trying to argue

20
21

with

the Court.
II

THE JUDGE:

Go ahead.

22 I!

MR. JONES:

But I have a real

concern

23 || here because I think that the Court's ruling

is

24 || clearly contrary to the case law-25 ||

THE JUDGE:

All right.

PENNY C. ABBOTT,

CSR/TRANSCRIBER
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1

MR. JONES:

-- in a long-term marriage.

2

THE JUDGE:

All right.

3

making $2,100 gross

4

MR. JONES:

$2,100 .

5

THE JUDGE:

She's basically making $1,700

MR. JONES:

Oh, well now you're rounding

9

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

10

MR. JONES:

But say it's the $400, $2,100

6

gross.

7
8

He's basically

out

11

and $1,700.

You take $200 off of hers for her

12

child support that makes it 15.

13

would be $270 or something off of his, that makes

14

it 18.

15

15.

16

that you're essentially spinning up.

17

still an income disparity of $300 bending over

18

backwards to his numbers. •

$300.

21 minus 3 is 18.

17 minus 2 is

So there's $300 even on your, your numbers

THE JUDGE:

19
20

manipulation.

21

$1,700.

22

he's $100 in the hole.

23

looks at it.

There's

Well I appreciate your

But he's making $2,100, she's making

He gives her $250, she gets $250.

MR. JONES:

24
25

You take $200, it

And

That's the way the Court

Well but Your Honor, but that

doesn't-PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR/TRANSCRIBER
PAGE 18 5

1

THE J U D G E :

End of story, Mr. J o n e s .

2

Court will be in r e c e s s .

3

MR. V L A H O S :

4

WHEREUPON,

Thank y o u , Your Honor.
the hearing was

concluded.

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

PENNY C. ABBOTT,

CSR/TRANSCRIBER
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ADDENDUM B

HILLYARD, ANDcRSON « OLSEN
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

ATTORNEYS AT

-•-foAii

LAW

n ; ;-•• r* •

175 EAST FIRST NORTH
L O G A N , U T A H 8 4 3 21
TELEPHONE (801)

m 12 ii•> o^

752-2610

:
rPt ?l .-;<JU

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOAN WILLIAMSON,
Petitioner,

)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
STUART KIM WILLIAMSON,
Respondent.

]

Case No. 954 207
Judge Clint S. Judkins

]

THIS MATTER, having come on regularly for trial on the
11th day of February, 1998, before the Honorable Clint S.
Judkins, Judge of the above-entitled Court, sitting without
a jury; and the Petitioner appearing in person and with her
attorney, Larry E. Jones, and the Respondent appearing in
person and with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos; and it having
been shown that the Respondent had previously filed a
Petition to Modify and then, by leave of Court, having filed
an Amended Petition to Modify; and each of the parties
having been sworn and testifying; exhibits having been
offered and received; witnesses having been called by both
parties; arguments having been made; and the Court being
fully cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, enters
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Petitioner and Respondent were divorced May 24,

1996.

MAR 251998

2.

There was one minor child born as issue of the

marriage, TO WIT: Julie Williamson, born September 23, 1985.
3.

The Petitioner was awarded the care, custody, and

control of said minor child, subject to the respondent's
right to visit.
4.
N

The Respondent was ordered to pay to the petitioner

the sum of $368.00 per month as and for child support, and

00

*

also $425.00 per month as and for alimony.

\-

z

5.

At the time of t,he divorce, the Respondent was

earning $3,550.00 per month, and the Petitioner was earning
o
S

$1,442.00 per month.
6.

Since the Decree was entered, there has been a

u.

<

substantial change of circumstances, in that respondent was

in

terminated from Morton, and that he no longer earns
z
u

5
o

$3,440.00.
7. The Respondent has obtained employment with

U)

a
u

|

Williamson Drywall, and the Respondent's income is $11:00
per hour.

The Court finds that with the overtime, the

Respondent earns $2,090.00 per month.
in

u

8.

The Respondent's last year's (1997) income based on

EZ
LL

^

the tax returns is $1,832.66 per month.

<

5.

The Petitioner's current income is $1,692.00 per

month which includes a part-time job, where she earns $75
per month, and also overtime averaging $70.00 per month.
10.

The Respondent's income is based on overtime and

his income in the year 1997.

2

11.

The Court finds that there has been a substantial

change of circumstance.
12.

Based on the substantial change of circumstance,

the alimony that respondent was ordered to pay to the
Petitioner shall terminate.
13.
«

Based on the parties "now" income, the support

shall be reduced to $252.06 plus Petitioner's out-of-pocket

<*
CD

g

medical insurance expense on the parties' daughter bringing

iD

z
o
o
i

§
z

child support to a total .of $271.64 per month effective
March 1, 1998.

attached hereto Exhibit "A" and by this reference

W

£

A copy of the Child Support Worksheet is

-. .

.

incorporated, herein.

Id

<

14.

The Court finds that the termination of alimony

Z
LJ
<J)
_J

O
tf

should be effective immediately with Petitioner to keep what

z
o

she has been paid to date and Respondent to owe no more.

a:

15. Each of the parties has incurred attorney fees and
the Court finds that each should be required to pay their

W

UJ

1
<

2
<
i
CO
UJ

y

own.
16.

The Respondent will have health and accident

insurance in effect, approximately the 1st day of March,

iZ

£

1998, which he will receive through his present wife's

<

employment and that if the petitioner has to pay health and
accident insurance for the minor child, then the standard
medical shall be adopted.

The Respondent would be obligated

to pay one-half of the costs of the health and accident
insurance for the minor child only, with the Petitioner to
provide the Respondent verification.
3

FROM THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING Findings of Fact, the
Court arrives at the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There has been a substantial change of

circumstances on the part of the Petitioner and the
Respondent, since the entry of the Divorce Decree.
CO
GO

5

2.

Effective as of the month of February, 1998. the

Respondent's obligation to pay the Petitioner alimony

D

z
o

terminates.

i

3.

Effective as of March 1, 1998, the child support

|

shall be $271.64, rather than the $368.00 as set forth in

E

the Decree of Divorce.

<
re-

4.

Any payments the Respondent made to the Petitioner

made to the Respondent on alimony shall stand and the

z
hi

3
z
o

Respondent will not be allowed to go retroactive.
5.
Whatever the payments the Respondent have made and

(0

Q

whatever payments the Respondent has received as and for

£

alimony shall be a wash, with no obligation owed by either

4

party.

o

6.

Each party shall assume and pay their own attorney

fees and costs.
7.

If the Respondent's wife obtains insurance for the

minor child, he shall maintain it, also.
Dated this

Z H da^g^^^.YT^A

m

1998

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was
mailed, postage prepaid to the following this

/?/ day of

March, 1998:

cj
S
5
D
CO

Pete N. Vlahos
Attorney at Law
2447 Kiesel Avenue .
Ogden, UT 84401 A
IJ07€4U£S
Secretary

v
C ) \ /
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EXHIBIT "A"
Ii. THE FIRST JUDICAL DISTRICT! COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOAN WILLIAMSON,

)
)

VS.

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY)

)

STUART KIM WILLIAMSON,

)

Civil No. 9541000207

MOTHER

FATHER

COMBINED

1. Enter the # natural and adopted children of this ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
|| mother and father for whom support is to be awarded.
| $1,643.00

2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly
income. Refer to Instructions for definition of
II income.

1

$2,090.00

2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is
actually paid.
(Do not enter alimony ordered for
|| this case) .

I

: il

'

J

ill
[WXi

2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not
enter obligations ordered for the children in Line
1) .
2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from line 12 of the
Children in Present Home Worksheet for either
|| parent.
3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is
the Adjusted Gross Income for child support
purposes.

$1,643.00

$2,090.00

44%

56%

$199.00

$252.06

$3,733.00

!

. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number
of children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find
the Base Combined Support Obligation. Enter it
|| here.
5. Divided each parent's adjusted monthly gross in
Line 3 by the COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in

II L i n e 3 .

|

6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to
obtain each parent's share of the Base Support
J Obligation.

J

7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in
Line 6 for the Obligor Parent or enter the amount from the
Low Income Table.
8.

Which parent is the obligor?

() Mother

9.

Is the support award ordered different from the guideline amount in Line 7?
() Yes () No If YES, enter the amount ordered: $__

$271.64

0 Father

10. What w e r e the reasons stated b y the Court for the deviation?
() p r o p e r t y settlement
() excessive debts of the marriage
() absence of need of the custodial parent
() other:
Attorney Bar N o .

0

Electronic filing

0 Manual

filing
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ADDENDUM E

HILLYARD, ANDfcRSON & OLSEN
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

i r

•OGAN

ATTORNEYS A T LAV/
175 EAST FIRST NORTH
L O G A N , U T A H 8 4 3 21
TELEPHONE (801) 752-2610
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOAN WILLIAMSON,
Petitioner,

ORDER MODIFYING
DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.
Case No. 954 207
Judge Clint S. Judkins

STUART KIM WILLIAMSON,
Respondent-.

THIS MATTER, having come on regularly for trial on the
11th day of February, 1998, before the Honorable Clint S.
Judkins, Judge of the above-entitled Court, sitting without
a jury; and the Petitioner appearing in person and with her
attorney, Larry E. Jones, and the Respondent appearing in
person and with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos; and each of
the parties having been sworn and testifying; exhibits ^
having been offered and received; witnesses having been
called; arguments having been made to the Court; and the
Court having rendered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, separately stated in writing.
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED as follows:
1.

There has been a substantial change of

circumstances since the entry of the Decree of Divorce.
2.

Effective as of the month of February, 1998, the

Respondent's obligation to pay the Petitioner alimony
^C5f

minates
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3.

Effective as of March 1, 1998, the child support

shall be $252.00, rather than the $368.00 as set forth in
the Decree of Divorce.
4.

Any payments the Respondent made to the Petitioner

made to the Respondent on alimony shall stand and the
Respondent will not be allowed to be retroactive.
«

5.

Whatever the payments the Respondent have made and

I
J

whatever payments the Respondent has received as and for

D

z

alimony shall be a wash,^with no obligation owed by either

o
o
J

. party.

X
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6.

Each party shall assume and pay their own attorney

i-

E
<

fees and costs.
7.

If the Respondent's wife obtains insurance for the

minor child, he shall maintain it, also.
§

Dated this Z^T

|

day of

W l V T ^

1998.

^ r f ^ O F ^ . B Y THE COURT^
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was
mailed, postage prepaid to the following this /J. ~~"~day of
March, 1998:
Pete N. Vlahos
Attorney at Law
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, UT 84401 ^
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